In the way: On the Tribunal Reforms Bill 2026

Tribunals are quasi-judicial bodies introduced into the Indian Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 under Part XIV-A. Article 323A deals with administrative tribunals for public service disputes, while Article 323B covers tribunals for other matters such as taxation, labor, and land reforms. They are designed to provide expert, speedy dispute resolution outside the traditional court system.

In the landmark Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), the Supreme Court of India ruled that Parliament cannot alter the ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution. In the L. Chandra Kumar (1997) case, the Court specifically declared that the power of judicial review vested in High Courts (Article 226/227) and the Supreme Court (Article 32) is a part of this basic structure, meaning tribunals cannot act as total substitutes for High Courts.

In the Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. case, the Supreme Court struck down the rules framed under the Finance Act 2017 because they gave the government too much control over tribunal member tenures and selection. The Court recommended establishing a National Tribunals Commission (NTC) to act as an independent, centralized statutory body to handle the selection, funding, and administration of tribunals, protecting them from executive interference.

The Finance Act 2017 was controversially used by the government to restructure several tribunals and take control of their service conditions, bypassing regular legislative scrutiny. When the Supreme Court struck down rules made under this Act, the government promulgated the Tribunals Reforms Ordinance 2021 to reintroduce clauses (like a 4-year tenure and a minimum age of 50 years) that the Court had already rejected as being harmful to judicial independence.

In November 2025, the Supreme Court of India, in the Madras Bar Association case, struck down provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act 2021 that attempted to keep tribunal member tenures at four years and set a minimum age limit of 50. Reaffirming judicial independence, the Court gave the Centre a strict four-month deadline to set up the National Tribunals Commission (NTC) to handle selection and administration autonomously.

The Tribunal Reforms Bill 2026 was passed rapidly by both houses of India’s Parliament (the Lok Sabha on August 10 and the Rajya Sabha on August 11, 2026). The bill was introduced to comply with the Supreme Court’s mandate in the Madras Bar Association (2025) case, which ordered the creation of a National Tribunals Commission (NTC). However, the bill’s passage without any floor debate raised concerns among legal experts and commentators.

The Tribunal Reforms Bill 2026 addresses several points of criticism raised by the judiciary. By restoring five-year terms (instead of the four-year terms proposed in 2021) and establishing uniform service conditions across different tribunals, the Bill aims to attract high-quality legal talent. The National Tribunals Data Grid is proposed to improve transparency and tracking of cases, while a savings clause prevents pending appointments from being cancelled.

Under Indian constitutional law, the doctrine of non-delegation dictates that Parliament cannot delegate its ‘essential legislative functions’ (such as declaring legislative policy or setting core standards) to the executive bureaucracy. In his separate opinion in the Rojer Mathew (2019) case, Justice Deepak Gupta emphasized that setting qualifications for judicial officers is a core policy decision that Parliament itself must make through law, rather than letting the executive write rules for it.

Section 3 of the Tribunal Reforms Bill 2026 mandates the establishment of the National Tribunals Commission (NTC). Critics and legal experts have flagged vague phrasing in this section regarding how the Commission’s members will be selected, which they worry leaves the door open for the executive to manipulate the composition and undermine the NTC’s independence.

Section 16 of the Bill introduces a screening mechanism where complaints against tribunal members are first examined by the parent ministry before being sent to the NTC. Critics point out that this creates a direct conflict of interest, as ministries are often parties to the disputes heard by these tribunals, giving the executive the power to suppress complaints against tribunal members.

In various judgments, the Supreme Court has ruled that to ensure judicial independence, the Chief Justice of India (CJI) or their nominee must have a major say in selecting tribunal members. In the NTC framework, critics argue that ‘consulting’ the CJI only for the chairperson and judicial members, while leaving the selection of technical members and overall administration largely to executive control, does not meet the standard of complete institutional independence.